We show that asynchronous t faults Byzantine system is equivalent to asynchronous t-resilient system, where unbeknownst to all, the private inputs of at most t processors were altered and installed by a malicious oracle.
Introduction
Recently, [13] , extending [4] , we have shown that for output colorless tasks -tasks whose correctness is preserved if in a correct output the output of p i is replaced by the output of p j , e.g., -agreement -an asynchronous t-resilient model is equivalent to synchronous network with t-mobile message adversary. That is, an adversary that each round can choose any t nodes and remove some of the messages they send. This motivated us to do the same for asynchronous Byzantine system. It turns out that we need to tolerate the possibility that t input values are faked.
How did the t resilience motivate us to examine t fault asynchronous Byzantine? In a t resilient system we can solve n − t + 1-set consensus. A recent result of Generalized Universality [14] implies that consequently one can view execution as a free for all and guarantee that at least n − t threads will advance from round to round. The only association between processors and threads is in activating a thread by posting an input to the thread and departing, once an output of the thread has been determined. In between, the advancement of threads is a cooperative process among the processors with no special privileges to a "thread ownership." Byzantine faults are static faults, we have fixed t processors which can exhibit such faults. In light of the disassociation of processors and threads in the t-resilient case, can't we thwart the effect of Byzantine processors by making every step of advancing the threads a cooperative effort?
The main result of the current paper is that indeed this is the case. A Byzantine behavior within the execution can be completely neutralized by making the execution of the threads a cooperative effort, rather than associating between processors and threads while executing. Thus, effectively we make the notion of malicious processors a misnomer. A gist of such an idea did occur to Coan almost 3 decades ago [12] . But as we elaborate later, Coan tried to precisely emulate the messages of a given protocol, and thus the main equivalence as models got lost.
Although motivated by Generalized Universality we give a tailor made argumentation to the fact that the execution of asynchronous Byzantine is effectively an execution of a standard asynchronous system, with a caveat. We have a Byzantine adversary that can tamper with at most t inputs. To model this we envision that in the first round ("Round 0") a valid set of inputs is sent to processors. An adversary can intercept t of these inputs and change them. From then on ("Round 1" on), we model the asynchronous t-resilient system as a synchronous one with a t-mobile message adversary. In each round we do not have "incorrect" processors, who are "malicious," etc., all we have are some t processors that might be experiencing a send malfunction in that round. Moreover, this model enables us to talk about all processors achieving the objectives of the protocol since the failure surfaces only in sending out some messages.
This result brings the asynchronous Byzantine model into the mainstream as we can analyze the system as a normal t-resilient system. Albeit, we do have to contend with inputs that might be inconsistent and ascribe some meaning if possible to the outputs. Two recent results are striking in this regard. In [16] the authors have formulated an ingenious task whose inputs are points R d and asked as a function of t and n whether the problem of -agreement that is in the convex-hull of every n − t inputs is solvable in the asynchronous Byzantine model. At the instigation of the second author who felt that the problem has nothing to do with the Byzantine setting, in [21] the same problem was analyzed in the benign case by some of the original authors in [16] and lo and behold they obtained the same results. Our paper here shows this was not a fluke.
In fact, to give more credence to our contention that we are not the only ones that should be surprised by the correspondence of the Byzantine t faults and the t-resilient systems, in [17] , the authors treat Byzantine asynchronous systems as a new animal and develop special topological methods for it. Our current paper stops such a research direction in its track.
The main challenge in obtaining the result is to show that any deterministic protocol that solves a problem in the t-mobile message adversary synchronous system can be simulated by a protocol running in the traditional t resilient asynchronous Byzantine system. Naturally, the adversary seems to have much more liberty in the traditional t resilient Byzantine model, since it can delay t correct processors, and arbitrarily control the t Byzantine nodes. Traditionally, researchers developed methods to exchange the set of values being received from each processor in order to ensure consistency at every stage of the protocol. Such methods achieve consistency, but still enable a faulty node to claim to receive values that were not sent, and extra methods are required to test consistency over the history of the protocol (as in our discussion of [12] below).
Our approach is to eliminate sending values beyond the initial inputs. Instead, every round each processor sends to others the list of processors it heard from in the previous round. Sending only this list drastically reduces the ability of the adversary to influence the state of the rest of the processors. With that in mind, the protocol is simulated locally at each processor. Each processor can determine which values each other processor needs to send and receive in each round, given the set of processors it claims to hear from. Schneider [19] studied the idea of using a state machine approach to implementing fault-tolerant services. His approach is to instruct all replicas to run the same state machine, and to agree on the inputs to the replicas. We take the idea further and instruct each processor to simulate the protocols of all other processors, and our simulation protocol ensures that all replicas at all correct processors apply the same sequence of steps. This resembles, to some extent, the approach of Gafni and Guerraoui [14] .
There were several attempts to simplify the t resilient asynchronous Byzantine model through ideas of simulating simpler models. Attiya and Welch [6] reduced the problem to Identical Byzantine. The pioneering work of Bracha [10, 11] was focused on improving the probabilistic protocol of Ben-Or [8] from n/5 to n/3 and in order to do so Bracha developed a basic tool to limit the power of the Byzantine adversary, The simulation we introduce in the paper makes use of this tool as part of the building block we introduce. Srikanth and Toueg [20] considered simulating the power of a signature scheme to limit the Byzantine adversary, both in a synchronous system and an asynchronous one. Neiger and Toueg [18] introduced direct simulations between models in order to solve consensus, but their simulations are limited to synchronous models.
Coan [12] technique comes the closest to our result. Coan was interested in taking a given algorithm written for the asynchronous fail-stop model with t < 1/3 and running it in an environment of t Byzantine processors. This is a more ambitious goal that what we present here. At first, cut the ramification of our paper is "for tasks that are immune to a change of at most t inputs, whatever is solvable asynchronously with t-benign faults is solvable with t Byzantine faults."
Coan pays for the ambition. The algorithm for the fail-stop environment has to be written in a specific form that is not shown to be universal and encompass every protocol, and then run through a compiler to validate "message correctness," and "filter out" incorrect messages. Thus, in hindsight, we believe Coan ideas can be tweaked to get our result, but this is in hindsight. The results were surprising to us as it should be to most researchers evidenced by the recent duplicate works mentioned above.
Last but not least, we do not address the question for the randomized environment when processors flip coins (remember, our processors are correct, only that the communication subsystem interfere with them). Coan faces the question then how to define "correct message." We do not face this problem since ours is full information and about the "communication pattern." In that case, we need all processors to agree on individual processor's claimed coin output, and we still face the problem that decided coin values might be biased, unlike the fail-stop case. Nevertheless as we show in the appendix if we go down to t < 1/4 n we can deal with randomized algorithms too. The case of t < 1/3 n is an open question.
Last, Coan do address the falsified input question and assumes some "correctness predicate." We leave it to the protocol designer to address the question what to do with a combination of inputs that is not a valid input combination.
Several papers discuss methods to simulate shared memory in a message passing system with Byzantine processors. These papers, as a by-product, limit the power of the Byzantine adversary. Malkhi and Rieter [15] use a simulation assuming that information from correct nodes is selfverifying (e.g., digitally signed). They also defined opaque masking quorum systems, which allows simulating a shared register without assuming that data values are self-verifying, but assumed a higher ratio of non-faulty nodes. Abraham, Chockler, Keidar, and Malkhi [3] present a simulation that provides weaker shared-memory properties and terminates only if the number of writes is finite. Aiyer, Alvisi and Bazzi [5] use a secret sharing scheme to simulate an atomic register, with Byzantine readers and (up to one-third of) Byzantine servers.
Problem Statement and Models
We assume a set of n processors Π = {p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n }. The paper focuses on the equivalence between a t resilient asynchronous Byzantine message passing system and a synchronous message passing, MOBfm, system. The MOBfm, called mobile omission Byzantine n, f, m, is a synchronous point-to-point message passing system, with an adversary that can replace the input values of a set S f ⊂ Π of f processors. In addition in each synchronous round, the adversary can choose a set S m of m processors and remove some or all of the messages sent by processors in S m .
We prove that regarding deterministic protocols, the MOBtt system, i.e., m = f = t, is equivalent to the classical asynchronous message passing model with t Byzantine faults, for n > 3t.
Obviously, each run in a MOBtt system is a possible run in an asynchronous Byzantine system. Therefore, what we need is to prove that any deterministic protocol running in the MOBtt model can be simulated by a deterministic protocol in an asynchronous Byzantine system.
We assume that each processor has an input value. A deterministic message passing protocol P that solves a problem in the MOBtt system runs for a given number of rounds of message exchange and by the end of the protocol run each processor produces an output. For simplicity assume that in the first round of running protocol P processors are expected to share their input values. 1 For convenience, we assume that all messages sent in a given synchronous round are tagged by a counter indicating the round number. Any protocol P can be viewed as a transition function F(M r−1 , S p , r) that instructs each processor p in a round r, given its current state S p , and given the set of messages, M , received in the previous round, which actions to take in the current round.
An action is what message to send to which processor and whether to produce an output. M 0 of the first round is just the input value. Thus, the state of the protocol at each round is a function of the initial input and the sequence of sets of messages received in all previous rounds.
Observe that any processor q that receives the sequence of sets of messages M 0 , ...M r−1 that were received by p in previous rounds can determine what message p should send it in round r. Moreover, q can also know what message any other processor should receive from p in round r. We take advantage of these observations in the simulation.
The challenge is to turn the Byzantine processors into processors that behave consistently with the protocol. The breakthrough idea is that instead of asking processors to send values we instruct them to send only the set of processors they received messages from in the previous round. Each processor uses this information to locally simulate the state of each other processor and to determine what messages each processor should have received and should have sent in each round.
As a step toward the result we first prove that t-resilient asynchronous Byzantine system is equivalent to a synchronous system that is similar to MOBtt, called MAOBt, in which the adversary replaces the input values of a set of size t and from that point on in each round it can drop messages sent by any processor, as long as it does not drop more than t incoming messages to any processor.
Simulating a protocol in a MAOBt system
In the simulation, we make use of several building blocks. The idea behind the simulation is to completely simulate the protocol at each processor. The first technique employed is to make sure that everyone commits to the message it sends in each round in a way that if any processor accepts a message m, everyone will eventually accept all m's causally ordered prior messages followed by the same message m. The second technique is to locally simulate the state of the protocol at every other processor, so we know what values should be sent and which should be received.
The first building block, CO SEND, is the Causally Ordered Reliable Broadcast primitive (in-1 Protocols in which the inputs are secrets can't be simulated using the technique we present.
spired by [10, 6] ). The second primitive resembles [14] , each processor is running locally the protocol's state machine of each other processor, according to the messages being received, to determine what the protocol instructs each processor to do. Let P be a deterministic message passing protocol that is executed in a MAOBt system. We will show a simulation of it in a t resilient asynchronous Byzantine system. In the simulation, in the first round each processor, p, uses CO SEND(1, p) to broadcast its input value, I. In each subsequent round, r, each processor, p, uses CO SEND(r, p) to broadcast to everyone the set of processors, π r−1 , from which it received messages in the previous round.
We start with an overview of the simulation protocol.
Now recursively, when it accepts via CO SEND a r, π r−1 from a processor p i , it uses the values every q j ∈ π r−1 should have sent in r − 1 to p i according to q j 's state machine SM j at round r −1 as values received by SM i in the previous round (round r −1) to determine what values processor p i should send to every other processor in round r.
The simulation protocol, presented in Algorithm 1, maintains three data structures. The set M contains the messages that were received via CO SEND and that are not processed yet, there is at most one such message per round per sender. Each entry in M contains a round number, say r, a processor ID, say p i , and the set of processors' IDs, from which processor p i claims to have received messages in round r − 1.
The setM contains the list of processes whose messages were already processed. Each entry inM contains a round number, say r, a processor ID, say p i , indicating that round r message from p i was received and processed. Every processor that processes a round r message from p i processes the identical message.
The CO SEND properties imply that when an entry is added to M, all casually prior entries were already accepted and processed, and as such are reflected in the respective state machines (as we explain later). Therefore, each message in M can be processed independently, since there are no causal dependencies among them. Processing a message is just applying it to the state machine of the sending processor, using the current state of the state machines of all the processors it claimed to receive their messages in the previous round. Once a message is processed it is removed from M and added theM. Observe that the simulation may indicate that at a certain round some processor is not sending a value to some other processor, then in such a case no such value is produced as an input to the relevant state machine.
The third data structure (accept) is the set of processors whose messages were accepted in the given round. Let π r be the set of all the processors whose messages were accepted by p via CO SEND during round r. Once |π r | ≥ n − t, processor p uses CO SEND(r + 1, p) to broadcast π r . After broadcasting this message processor p continues to accept previous rounds' messages via CO SEND and continues to apply them to the various state machines. Each processor continues this process, outputs its output, and sends messages until its state machine halts. 2 Algorithm 1: Simulating a deterministic protocol of a MAOBt system in an asynchronous Byzantine system with n > 3t invoke CO SEND(1, p) to broadcast I; /* broadcast the input value, a processor sends also to itself */
5.
r := 1; /* the round number */ 6. do until SMp halts:
wait until |accept[r]| ≥ n − t and p ∈ accept[r]; /* participate in all CO SEND( , * ), ≤ r, protocols */ 8.
9.
invoke CO SEND(r + 1, p) to broadcast accept[r]; /* broadcast the accepted set in round r */
10.
r := r + 1;
11.
end.
12. In the Background: Execute for each r , pi, π ∈ M: /* message received from pi for round r */ Observe that the simulation, presented in Algorithm 1, produces per each processor an agreed upon sequence of sets of values M 0 , ...M r−1 received by it's SM in the related rounds, thus, simulating the exact behavior of protocol P . This implies that the above simulation is a protocol to simulate in a t resilient asynchronous Byzantine system a deterministic message passing protocol, P , in a MAOBt system.
The delicate points in the simulation reside in the details of CO SEND, which we now describe. The CO SEND protocol, Algorithm 2, is invoked per processor per sending round and consists of 5 conceptual steps. Initially (step 1) the sender of the current instance of the protocol sends its initial value to everyone. Thus, everyone should wait to receive the appropriate initial value. Due to asynchrony it may take time, but without faults, it would eventually arrive to everyone. Because of maliciousness, the message may not arrive to every processor. Moreover, conflicting values might be sent to different processors. The following steps intend to address exactly these difficulties.
Algorithm 2: CO SEND (r, s): A casually ordered reliable broadcast with asynchronous Byzantine faults for n > 3t /* executed by processor p with sender s in round r, invoked once per round */ M andM are globally maintained sets 1. let V be the set of m1 and m2 protocol messages received; /* each processor sends also messages to itself */ 2. Init: if p = s then send vs to all; /* s is the sender and vs the value it broadcasts */ 3. Upon receiving a protocol message: 4. case received v from s: send m1(v) to all; /* executed at most once per protocol invocation */ 5.
case V contains m1(v) from n − t different processors or m2(v) from t + 1 different processors: send m2(v) to all;
case V contains m2(v) from 2t + 1 different processors: /* process the sender's message */ 7.
if r > 1 wait until ∀q ∈ v, r − 1, q ∈M; /* wait for the predecessors */ In the 3rd step, a processor that has received n − t identical copies of m 1 messages for the same value, sends m 2 message. Notice that if the original sender is correct, this will eventually happen at every processor. Observe, that no two correct processors send m 2 messages with conflicting values since the protocol instructs a correct processor to send at most a single m 1 message, the n − t threshold prevents two correct processors from getting n − t copies of m 1 messages for different values. Notice that a processor may receive several m 2 messages without receiving n − t copies of m 1 messages, if it receives at least t + 1 m 2 messages it knows that at least one correct processor have sent one, so it can also join that by sending an m 2 message (potentially skipping step 2 on the way).
To complete this part of the protocol a processor (step 4) waits to receive 2t + 1 m 2 messages. Once it receives that many identical m 2 messages it knows that eventually every processor will receive at least t + 1, will send a m 2 message to everyone else, which leads to everyone eventually receiving 2t + 1 m 2 messages.
For r = 1, the round of exchanging the input values, this completes the protocol. In all future rounds, there is an additional step (step 5) of waiting for all messages that are causally prior to the current message to be accepted (and processed), before the current message will be accepted. The content of the message, v, specifies explicitly the set of prior messages we need to wait for. If the sender is correct this will eventually happen at every processor. If the sender is faulty and claimed to receive messages from a processor that never sent it a message, the waiting for prior messages might not end, and the state machine of that (faulty) sender will practically be blocked at every processor. However, if any correct will agree to accept the message, eventually everyone will receive all the prior messages and will accept the message.
Given the above discussion, it is clear that if the sender is correct, all processors eventually will complete the protocol and will accept its value. Moreover, if any correct processor accepts a message, every correct will end up eventually accepting the same message, after accepting all causally prior messages to that message. Lemma 1. For n > 3t, Algorithm 2 implements a Causally Ordered Reliable Broadcast transport layer in which a sender s uses CO SEND to send its messages and each processor accepts messages that satisfies:
CO1: If a correct sender, s, sends a consecutive sequence of messages, then every processor accepts the sequence in the same order that it was sent. CO2: For r > 1, if a processor, p, accepts a v via CO SEND(r, s), it already accepted v j via CO SEND(r − 1, p j ), for every p j ∈ v. CO3: If a processor, p, accepts a v 1 via CO SEND(r, s) followed by a v 2 via CO SEND(r + 1, s), then any other processor q will end up accepting v 1 followed by v 2 .
The above discussions, Lemma 1 and given that a processor moves to the next round, once it accepts and processes some n − t current round messages implies the following result.
Lemma 2. Given a deterministic protocol P that is viewed as a function F(M r−1 , S p , r), for r ≥ 1, in a MAOBt system, the protocol presented in Algorithm 1 simulates it in a t resilient asynchronous Byzantine system, given that n > 3t.
Simulating a protocol in a MOBtt system
To finalize the main result of the paper we will now expand the simulation from simulating a protocol P that runs is a MAOBt system to a protocol in a MOBtt system. The extension is to ensure that before a processor adapts the accept set it communicates with others to converge to accept sets such that all sets have at least n − t processors in common. To achieve that we introduce a third technique, we run a couple of rounds of the equivalent to a full information message exchange to make sure that everyone shares messages from a set of at least n − t processors. Once this happens the processor takes its next step.
The third primitive, COMMON CORE, is an adaptation of the Get-Core approach mentioned in [6] (attributed to the second Author) and a variation of it that was later presented in [1] as Binding Gather, and using ideas from [2] .
Each processor invokes the COMMON CORE protocol, appearing in Algorithm 3, with a set of n − t different processors IDs. Each correct processor, p, returns as an output a set of at least n − t different processors' IDs, such that at least n − t of them are shared by the outputs of all correct processors. The COMMON CORE properties are:
• Validity: At each correct processor, the output set of IDs contains the input set of IDs.
• Commonality: There exists a set of n − t IDs that appears in the output set of every correct processor.
• Termination: All correct processors eventually output some non-empty set of IDs.
A set that is in every output set is called a common core. The COMMON CORE primitive is described in Algorithm 3. In the first round, everyone sends its accept[r] set. In the background the processor continues to update its accept[r] set with messages it continues to accept. To complete the first round of COMMON CORE, it waits to receive at least n−t sets that are contained in its current state of the set accept[r]. This will eventually happen due to the CO SEND properties, and the fact that there are at least n − t correct processors. Once this happens it sends again its current set and waits again to received at least n − t second round sets that are contained in its current state of the set. wait until |{j | received(r, 1, πj) from pj, and πj ⊆ accept[r]}| ≥ n − t; wait until |{j | received(r, 2, πj) from pj, and πj ⊆ accept[r]}| ≥ n − t;
The correctness proof is similar to the proof of get-core in [6] . The original proof did not include Byzantine nodes, therefore we need to change it a bit. Define a table T with n − t raws and n − t columns, that refer to a setΠ of n − t correct processors. The accept[r] value of each correct processor contains at least n − t IDs, therefore it contains at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 IDs of processors inΠ represented in T . For p i , p j ∈Π, entry T [i, j] in the table is 1 if p j is one of the n − t processors that p i waited for in order to complete the first round of COMMON CORE, and 0 otherwise. Observe that if 1 appears in entry T [i, j], the accept i [r] sent by p i in the second round contains all the n − t IDs appearing in the initial accept j [r] sent by p j in the first round of the COMMON CORE protocol.
Since all processors inΠ will eventually invoke COMMON CORE, T will contain at least (n − t)(t + 1) entries with 1. This implies that there is an ID of a correct processor, sayp, that appears in at least t + 1 raws. Thus, there are at least t + 1 correct processors whose second round set includes the n−t IDs that appear in the initial set ofp. Before completing the protocol, each processor waits to get the sets of n − t processors, so it includes the set of at least one of these t + 1 processors, thus includes the set of n − t IDs appearing in the initial list ofp.
Lemma 3. For n > 3t, the protocol presented in Algorithm 3 implements the COMMON CORE properties.
To obtain the final protocol we add the COMMON CORE invocation to the simulation protocol presented in Algorithm 1. We invoke the COMMON CORE protocol on all the accept sets of a given round after completing Line 7 and before executing Line 9 of Algorithm 1. The output of the COMMON CORE is used in Line 9 as the set of processors from which we received messages from in that round. Algorithm 4 presents the complete protocol. Theorem 1. Given a deterministic protocol P that is viewed as a function F(M r−1 , S p , r), for r ≥ 1, in a MOBtt system, the protocol presented in Algorithm 4 simulates it in a t resilient asynchronous Byzantine system, given that n > 3t. Corollary 1. For n > 3t and deterministic protocols, the t resilient asynchronous Byzantine system and the MOBtt system are equivalent.
For simplicity, we assume that the protocol instructs each processor to flip a fair coin at the beginning of each round. The same construction can be extended to every other required distribution of random values. What we show now is a method to produce for each simulated processor a coin flip with an arbitrary small bias.
In case n > 4t one can compute any probabilistic function using Asynchronous Multi-PartyComputation, in the presence of up to t Byzantine faults, see [9, 7] . We make use of such a protocol. The protocol SIM COIN(s) (Algorithm 5) returns a shared coin c on behalf of a prespecific processor p i at all participating processors. The main difference from previous protocols is Line 16 that obtains the collective coin, and in the next line we apply the result to the state machine of processor p i .
The question of whether there is a small bias coin flipping protocol for n > 3t that runs is a constant number of rounds is an open question.
